Afg̲h̲āni’s ethical views are found in his analysis of the causes of the decay of the Muslim community. One of the reasons underlying the backwardness of the Muslims is described by him as a deterioration of their moral standards. His treatment of morality is devoid of that discursive and didactic style which is generally employed by the few Muslim thinkers who wrote about essentially ethical problems. Among them the works of Ibn Miskawaih and al-g̲h̲azāli are recognized as authoritative texts of Muslim ethics.

It would be found that between these two, Afg̲h̲āni chose the former as more close to his point of view. In his approach, a lack of emphasis on theological basis for moral values closely resembles the insistence on rational sanction for them in Ibn Miskawaih. Afg̲h̲āni’s concept of morality has as its chief object the good of society as a whole. Consequently, his views on man’s perfection, criterion of virtue and vice, nature of human emotions and the control of reason which they require, and the need of moral discipline for the maintenance of society follow the general line prescribed by Ibn Miskawaih. The latter’s conception of morality and society would become clear by a passage from his Ta_hz̲īb al-Ak̲h̲lāq:

“There is a multiplicity of forms of happiness and no man alone can achieve them all. Men, therefore, must live together in societies in order to aid one another in attainment of them. Every good and every happiness is indeed derived from association, attaining perfection only in society, and when achieved it is common to all who have partaken in the effort leading to it. Each individual in the society helps the others as the members of human body help one another. True morality, then, is a social virtue and is not to be attained by the solitary and the recluse.”1

Indeed, the structure of Afg̲h̲āni’s ethical system as a whole is based upon that of Ibn Miskawaih, although in certain matters he has drawn much from al-g̲h̲azāli. However, his ethics does not rely exclusively upon these two philosophers. Basing his theory upon them, Afg̲h̲āni adds to it his own interpretation of morality and the practical aspects of moral conduct.

Regarding the development of individual personality, he holds that unlike animals, who are born with instincts enabling them to know what is beneficial and what is harmful to them and to meet the needs of their lives, man is born without such instincts. “He is like a plain slate, a book with blank pages, or a land un-ploughed and uninhabited.”2 He adopts same thoughts, opinions, manners and the moral code which are followed by his parents and close relations.3 For his mode of thinking, inclinations, passion for unfolding the mysteries of physical and metaphysical spheres, search into the secrets of the external phenomenon of life, he is indebted to the influences inherited from his parents and borrowed from the environment in which he is brought up.4

However, Afg̲h̲āni does not mean that man’s thoughts and opinions are borrowed entirely from the environment and the persons around him. A man has two great faculties of reason and observation which are endowed by God to all human beings without any discrimination. By virtue of physical and mental faculties, they enjoy full freedom of will and action in order to achieve perfection (kamāl).5

The achievement of perfection, he points out, depends on the man himself. It depends upon the full-fledged activity of the faculty of reason.6 Reason is composed of observations and the knowledge attained through them. Each act of observation produces a corresponding thought, provoking an action which in its turn incites a new thought. In this way thought and action continue to influence each other as long as the relationship between soul and body continues to exist.7 In view of the fact that observations, thought impressions, and will to act cause each other to originate, man stands responsible for his own actions. Here it is that Afg̲h̲āni brings in the need for a moral discipline. He argues that since each individual pursues his aims according to his own mode of thinking, natural instincts and inclinations, a clash among different individuals is imminent at any stage. Therefore, a system of principles is to be evolved which could help avoid such conflicts. Such a system could not be other than having firm ethical foundations.

Afg̲h̲āni holds that society is influenced by the thoughts and actions of individuals just as human nature is affected by the climatic changes. It is for this reason that God has sent prophets and revealed holy scriptures so that harmony in the thoughts and actions of individuals could be maintained and society saved from disintegration.8 Like any natural phenomenon which obeys one or the other system of unalterable laws, there exists a system of moral laws which must be followed strictly to attain the summum bonum of life—happiness (sa‘ādat).9

Afg̲h̲āni points out that the purpose of creation and of the system of natural laws is to make life easy and peaceful. Giving instances of physical and biological laws which govern the physical and biological world, he suggests that all these facts explain God’s purpose of keeping life a going. In the same way ethical laws aim at the preservation of a peaceful society and the achievement of happiness for mankind, at large. Deterioration of a society is directly the result of a fall in moral standards. When society does not follow the ethical principles in a rational way, it disintegrates.10

The basic issue of morality is the interpretation of virtue and vice. Afg̲h̲āni defines virtues (faz̤ā‘il) and vices (raz̲ā‘il) in the context of social utility of human actions. Thus, moral qualities which create love and unity among human beings are called virtues. Such virtues are thinking, freedom from superstition, nobility, loyalty, chastity, large-heartedness, love, respect for society, preference of the good of others to one’s own, etc. Vices are those qualities which destroy a social relationship. These are immodesty, treachery, perfidy, hypocrisy, envy, pride, mischief-making, jesting, cowardice, etc.11

Virtues

Virtues purify and strengthen society. They unite individuals, make them act with the same impetus, obeying one single idea and having one common purpose. All virtues put together constitute justice (‘adl). When justice is maintained in a society, then, each individual refrains from violating the rights of others. In this way equality and unity are preserved in a society.12 Virtues occupy the same place in a society as life-force in human beings. Life-force gives each physical organ a power sufficient for its own functioning without disturbing the functions of other organs. In the same way virtues restrict individual actions to certain limits. The prosperity, honor and strength of the whole society is assured when individuals share the gains of society attained by their own collective efforts.13

Vice

Vices lower men to the same extent as the virtues raise them in the eyes of society. Individuals, indulging in vices and sins, no longer remain faithful either to their nation or to themselves. Vices lower their morals, make them unmindful of their duties to and rights of their fellow-beings, family, tribe, nation and religion. In this way vices break the unity of a society.14
To regard love and unity as the only criteria in judging qualities as virtues or vices is a principle which points to a deep social insight on the part of Afg̲h̲āni. It also shows that he was conscious of the fact that moral discipline could be more appealing if it was based upon social foundations than described as a religious dogma.
He presses his point a little further by explaining the importance of reason in social activity. The faculty of reason plays an important role in attaining the two-fold object of satisfying natural desires and at the same time observing the welfare of society. He holds that, for the sake of society’s existence and convenience in human livelihood, dispositions and habits, reason must be followed. Reason should control human desires and keep them within proper limits.15 Then, following Aristotle’s doctrine of the ‘mean’, he states that qualities serve as virtues when restrained within certain limits but when carried to excess, they turn into vices. So a middle position should be maintained. Al-g̲h̲azāli in his Iḥyā-yi ‘Ul~um al-Dīn points out that excess or deficiency in qualities leads to vices, which occupy the extreme positions, while virtues lie in the middle, between the extremes.16 The same view is held by Ibn Miskawaih.17 Applying the principle of the mean, Afg̲h̲āni studies certain qualities, as follows:18

Love of Life

Love of life, he holds, is the dynamic force behind all cultural phenomena. It inspires men to exercise all their energies to make life grand and rich with the wealth of fine arts and scientific discoveries. All cultural achievements, arts, crafts and scientific inventions are expressions of the love for life. It led man to the studies of the qualities of minerals, plants and animals, the nature of different kinds of lands and winds and movements of the stars. However, if this love for life develops into love for one’s own life it becomes a vice, makes man coward and humble and results in one’s destruction.

Self-love

Self-love obliges a man to struggle for material comforts and honorable positions. This natural desire turns into a curse if exceeded beyond certain limits and makes a man selfish, who sacrifices the good of others for his own benefit.

Desire for Superiority over Others

The desire to become superior to others in all fields of life inspires men to learn all sciences and arts. If it is not checked, this quality may develop into pride and envy. Man becomes proud only when in his ignorance he presumes that he has achieved perfection which, in fact, could not be attained except by incessant struggle and hard work. As a result of his pride, he drifts away from his social circle and becomes useless to society. On the other hand, if he fails to satisfy his desire for superiority it changes into envy. Since envious men find themselves incompetent to equal the successful men, they concentrate their energies upon pointing out the defects of the latter and in obstructing their activities. Such persons gradually precipitate disruption in society.

Praise and Fame

Afg̲h̲āni remarks that usually men perform good deeds in order to satisfy their desire to be praised and to make a name for themselves. Such desire makes them act for common good and contributes towards the growth of sciences and arts for the benefit of society. All literary achievements and scientific discoveries are the product of such a desire. Again, it is for a lasting fame that great men sacrifice their lives for their country. However, if this desire is made an end in itself, it loses its real value. Anxious to get fame and praise, people allow themselves to practice hypocrisy, treachery, and deception. However, such an artificial fame produces no spiritual pleasure. It robs men of the spirit of struggle and labor and turns them into idle and useless beings.
Afg̲h̲āni points out that recognition of the noble deeds and condemnation of base actions invite people to act for common good in preference to individual gains. At the same time, this acknowledgement of one’s services for the society should not exceed its limits and develop into flattery. Undue praise and flattery might fill a man with vanity, make him ignore his defects and neglect the reformation of his conduct. Thus he would cease to be a useful member of society.19
Afg̲h̲āni states that there are persons who, regardless of their own good, act for the betterment of their country, nation and religion. Their whole lives are spent in hardships and spiritual sufferings. They have to suffer the wrath and opposition of even those persons who would ultimately be reaping the benefits of their struggle.20 Afg̲h̲āni, however, maintains that it should not be supposed that these persons go through hell and fire for nothing. In fact, they have a natural desire to be praised by the grateful multitudes for whom they have gone through such hardships. This is the praise of a real and pure nature. The desire for real praise is like spiritual nourishment and psychological satisfaction for human nature. When a man reaches the height of perfection he puts aside petty desires and artificial comforts of baser sentiments and clings more closely to the passion for immortal fame and lasting praise. He leaves no stone unturned in performing great deeds in order to receive sincere commendation. The life of a virtuous man may be divided into two parts: one, which continues from his birth till his death, and the other, which begins by his first deed for the good of humanity and lasts till eternity. The former is confined to himself and the latter is retained in the hearts of the people for a long time. It is for this lasting life that the men of honour sacrifice their temporal pleasures. Such self-sacrificing personalities should come forward for the good of mankind. It is due to their brave and selfless deeds, which the others dare not accomplish, that a nation makes rapid advances in the spheres of science, morality, and culture.21

Love of Country, Nation and Religion

Patriotic, national and religious sentiments also inspire men to compete with each other in the achievement of virtues and perfection. Such sentiments unify large groups of people to perform noble deeds, protect the common rights and take action in defense of their country and religion. However, such sacred sentiments should not be overemphasized in which case they might deny truth and justice to the deserving, forfeit people’s rights, and result in oppression against others.22

Optimistic Attitude towards Life

Among the moral qualities and sentiments which are helpful for individual as well as social welfare, Afg̲h̲āni lays great emphasis upon ‘hope’ as an attitude of life. On the other hand, despondency and despair act as poison for human energies and talents, since they hamper progress and lead a nation to destruction. A desperate man loses confidence in all his capabilities, degenerates morally, and surrenders to various kinds of humiliations. Such men lead miserable lives and do not object to working for the benefits of people who are totally alien to them and who fully exploit their weaknesses to their own advantage.
What could the cause of such despondency and pessimism be? According to Afg̲h̲āni, it is due to a lack of faith in the omnipotence of God. The cause of human despondency, he holds, is that man wrongly regards his actions as emanating from his own power and will, and that he has full control over them. So, when a man experiences successive failures, he feels that he is helpless and has no means to overcome the obstacles, and thus he turns desperate. On the other hand, if one has firm faith in an All-Powerful God who controls the universe and always comes to the succor of the faithful, then there is no room for despair or frustration.23 Belief in God, thus, infuses in man an everlasting confidence which helps him in the achievement of high rewards, notwithstanding sufferings and hardships.

It is significant that throughout his discussion on morality Afg̲h̲āni lays great emphasis upon social values which must be kept in view while determining individual conduct as good or bad. This leads to the question: what should be the basis of a society where individual desires would be satisfied equitably, and, second, what part do the moral values play in such a social set up? Afg̲h̲āni has discussed this issue in detail.24 He suggests that there are four possible methods of keeping individual desires and ambitions under control for the security of the society; namely, force, nobility of soul, state authority, and religious faith.

Force

According to this method, force is applied in order to safeguard human rights and to resist oppression. It would be tantamount to a reign of terror if the mighty always dominated the weak. This would result in the destruction of human race.

Nobility of Soul

This method requires men to become spiritually noble and refrain from ignoble acts and qualities. Afg̲h̲āni points out that it is a well-known fact that the quality of the nobility of the soul has no determined nature or specific value, which could universally be applied by different communities to control human desires and satisfy individual rights, and thus, establish a (social) system on firm grounds. It would be noted that certain qualities which are treated as ignoble by one community are treated as noble by the other. Theft and murder, for instance, are treated as noble qualities by the wild tribes, but are condemned by the civilized people. In the same way, treachery, cheating, and cunningness are looked upon as disgraceful by one community while for the other they stand for cleverness, perfection, and practical wisdom. It is interesting that, according to Afg̲h̲āni, moral values are not followed absolutely for their own sake. In fact, man’s desire to behave virtuously is nearly always motivated by the hope of extending his economic resources. Man acquires noble qualities, for he knows that if he is described by people as a noble person, he would have greater economic opportunities and a wider social circle. Besides, he would gain the confidence of others by the nobility of his character and would be considered trustworthy and righteous. On the other hand, a bad character is shunned by all and continues to lose his friends until even the resources of his livelihood are closed upon him. Thus, the desire for acquiring the quality or spiritual nobility, its strength or weakness, existence or non-existence and its different levels and stages and their influences, depend upon the economic conditions of different classes (of society). In other words, different classes of people try to attain this quality in as far as it benefits their livelihood and protects them from any harm or injury. Each class utilizes this quality chiefly to safeguard its livelihood and to enhance its prestige. However, there are certain classes which do not regard the quality of spiritual nobility as worthy of acquiring, e.g., the rulers and the wealthy, who do not mind to behave in an ignoble way, especially with those who are inferior to them in position and status. They do not view their own actions as base or ignoble, whereas if anyone from amongst the common people behaves in this manner, he is accused by them of meanness and has consequently to suffer economic hardships. Ironically enough, none of the classes view the ignoble acts of the rulers and the wealthy as immoral. Instead, they try to interpret and justify them in some way or the other. Afg̲h̲āni states that the lower class receives such a treatment from the higher class for the simple reason that the latter feels quite immune and secure from the repercussions of its own immoral acts. Therefore,

Afg̲h̲āni believes that if world administration is based upon the principle of spiritual nobility, higher classes would continue to play their oppressive role over the lower classes and this would result in incessant tyranny upon the human race. Again, if, as described above, man is attracted towards noble deeds for the sake of material prosperity, then one cannot rule out that he might employ secret dealings, bribery, and other crooked means for achieving his objective. In view of the above facts, Afg̲h̲āni rejects moral discipline as an effective method of maintaining social peace. However, this method could succeed in its objective if it is sanctioned by a religion which has determined the essence of the nobility of soul in specific terms.

Authority of the State

The third method of protecting people’s rights is the authority of the State. However, although the State could take action against blatant oppression, it is incapable of punishing the people engaged in conspiracies and secret dealings. Besides, the rulers and their officials themselves are men of low character and nothing could prevent them from following their base desires. If the State is made the protector of people’s rights, it would mean complete ruin of the defenseless and the poor. Hence, Afg̲h̲āni rejects this method, also, as disastrous for social justice. He states that the only medium which could uphold common rights and protect people from the oppression of the powerful is religious faith.

Religious Faith

Belief in God and in reward and punishment are the fundamentals of religious faith. These two beliefs control base desires, eliminate external and internal oppressions, protect human rights, maintain peace, preserve social structure and culture and establish social transactions and economic affairs on firm foundations. Nothing but these two beliefs, especially, the belief in reward and punishment, could lead people towards virtue and restrain them from vice.
Afg̲h̲āni states that all world religions have furnished mankind with three beliefs (‘aqā‘id) and three qualities (k̲h̲aṣā‘il), which have helped individuals in the achievement of intellectual and spiritual perfection and have contributed towards the progress of society, world civilization, international relations, and towards the security of human race.25 The three beliefs are:

1 “Man is the noblest of the creation of God.” Afg̲h̲āni holds that one who has faith in this belief would naturally refrain from barbarous habits and bestial qualities which would be revolting to him. The deeper the roots of this belief, the greater would be the disgust and man would advance in the sphere of reason and culture until he attains that state of life which is the ideal of the philosophers, namely, a life based upon love, wisdom, and justice. In short, such a belief restrains man from vices and, along with his intellectual and rational faculties, leads him towards civilization.

2 “His is the noblest nation (ummah).” A man who has faith in this belief would struggle hard so that his nation may become equal with other nations of the world in every sphere of life whether it is spiritual, rational, or economic. He would never be prepared to see his nation in decay and misery while the other nations lead a prosperous and dignified life. Thus, such a belief is the most important factor for the overall progress of one’s nation.

3 “Man has been created to attain perfection.” Inspired by this belief man would try to adorn his reason with science ad arts and give full expression to all of his inherent practical faculties, noble thoughts and great qualities. He would keep his soul pure of base desires and earn his wealth through proper means and spend it in a proper way. This belief aims at establishing a civilization in which each individual has the knowledge of his rights and follows the straight path of justice.

The three qualities are: modesty (ḥayā), trust (amānat), and sincerity (ṣadāqat). Modesty is a feeling of remorse which the soul experiences on committing evil actions. Afg̲h̲āni holds that modesty restrains people from committing evil deeds more effectively than a number of laws and the police force. No punishment or sentence could prevent an immodest man from actions which create disruption in society. Social transactions, trust of promise and the honor of man depend on this quality. Modesty also represents pride (nak̲h̲vat) and honour (g̲h̲airat) – the two qualities which are the major reasons of intellectual and material progress of nations. Trust is the essence of mutual relations and social transactions among individuals. Afg̲h̲āni states that the administration of the social and economic affairs of a nation is looked after by its government, whether it is democratic, constitutional or despotic, through the organs of legislature, executive, judiciary, revenue and finance. He points out that the persons controlling these organs could serve society sincerely only if they possess the quality of trust. Otherwise there would be no peace and security for the people or for their rights and loot and arson would reign supreme, the means of trade would be closed and the whole nation would ultimately be ruined. Thus, the quality of trust helps in maintaining peace, unity and justice in a society.

In view of the fact that the needs of human livelihood are numerous and difficult to procure, man is obliged to seek cooperation and guidance of others. Such cooperation, Afg̲h̲āni points out, could not be obtained unless the people are sincere to each other. Hence, sincerity is essential for a social organization and for providing the means of livelihood for all.

The above analysis gives us a clear idea of Afg̲h̲āni’s ethical outlook. He considers morality as a social necessity. Morality does not come foremost; it follows human nature. Describing happiness, in the Aristotelian manner, as the supreme end of human effort, Afg̲h̲āni emphasizes the fact that individual good rests in the good of the whole society. Morality functions as an effective system of principles which maintain a balance between individual ambitions and social obligations. Afg̲h̲āni describes ethical values as relative to the conditions prevailing in and the class structure of a society. Moral values change not only in different societies but among different classes of a single society, as well. However, society cannot function peacefully without some stable ethical foundation. It seems that Afg̲h̲āni was conscious of the fact that human behavior could not be dictated by certain abstract moral principles. It was, perhaps, to avoid this obstacle that he lays down his own interpretation of virtues and vices which is purely utilitarian in character. According to this unorthodox definition, those qualities which tend to unite individuals are virtues and those which cause disintegration in society are vices. It is significant that this interpretation lacks any special reference to theological sanction. Even when he specifies religion as the best among the means of bringing peace to society, he singles out the principle of reward and punishment, as the most important and relevant, chiefly because it has practical importance of ethical behavior.

References

1 Cf. Levy, op. cit., p. 225
2 M, p. 113
3 Ibid., p.114
4 ‘Urvah I, p. 87. Cf. Al-g̲h̲azāli: “Training should be lifelong and it should begin at birth, for then the child’s mind is a precious jewel, free of all marks or figure. By education there can be engraved upon it all that is necessary to incline him either towards the good (which will give him happiness in this world and the next and bring him reward in which his parents and teachers share), or towards evil (indulgence in animal sloth) when he will be unhappy and perish.” Levy. op. cit., p. 218
5 ‘Urvah, ii, p. 216; M, p. 115
6 According to Ibn Miskawaih, “the best of men may be described as the man who performs persistently his own distinctive function, making use of his intellectual faculty as a means, and exercising his practical faculty so as to attain the end in view.” D. M. Donaldson, Studies in Muslim Ethics, London, 1953, p. 128; See also Levy, op. cit., p. 228
7 ‘Urvah, I, p. 116
8 ‘Urvah, ii, p. 161
9 M, pp. 119-120
10 M, pp. 121-22
11 ‘Urvah, I, p. 191
12 Ibid., p. 191
13 Ibid., pp. 195-96. Cf. Ibn Miskawaih: “And if they (individuals) should agree at one time to work together in the quest of these many kinds of happiness, on the basis of mutual assistance (mu’āvinah), then there would be many kinds of good attained in common (al-k̲h̲airāt mushtaraka), and happiness would be something allotted or shared among them. They would rival one another for it, so that one would get part of it. In this way the perfection of mankind would be accomplished for all, by the help of all.” Donaldson, op. cit., p. 124
14 Ibid., p. 198
15 M, p. 123. Both Ibn Miskawaih and al-g̲h̲azāli regarded reason as a counselor to human desires. They used the Platonian illustration of the hunter who rides a horse and is accompanied by a hunting dog, to make clear the necessity of the rational-self retaining full authority over the other selves in the struggle for moral perfection. See for Ibn Miskawaih, Donaldson, op. cit., p. 129; for al-g̲h̲azāli, Cf. Levy, op. cit., p. 216
16 Levy, Ibid.
17 Donaldson, op. cit., p. 128
18 M, pp. 123-33
19 Ibid., p. 13
20 ‘Urvah, ii, p. 66 ff.
21 Ibid, p. 66
22 M, pp. 13-14
23 ‘Urvah, ii, pp. 34-37
24 H, pp. 63-74
25 H, pp. 21-37